Dr Richard Rowland

Senior Research Fellow

Dr Richard Rowland

Areas of expertise: metaethics; ethics, value theory; normativity; metaepistemology; moral epistemology, moral error theory

Email: Richard.rowland@acu.edu.au

Location: ACU Melbourne Campus

Richard Rowland works on meatethics, normativity, and moral epistemology. His book, The Normative and the Evaluative: The Buck-Passing Account of Value (OUP, 2019) is the first book-length defence of the buck-passing account of value. According to this account, for something to be good is for there to be reasons for everyone to have pro-attitudes towards it. The book shows why this account is important, why we should accept it, and how it can be extended to provide an account of wrongness and other normative properties. He has also worked on the relationship between epistemic and practical normativity. And he is currently working on an account of genuine normativity in terms of value that has implications for normativity in the legal, political, and aesthetic domains as well as the normativity of particular emotions.

He has also done a lot of work on moral disagreement in metaethics, moral epistemology. He is currently working on the impact of moral disagreement for normative ethics, applied ethics, and political philosophy. His forthcoming book, Moral Disagreement (Routledge 2020), discusses the similarity and differences between how moral disagreement affects metaethics, moral epistemology, normative ethics, and political philosophy.

He has co-produced several episodes of the popular philosophy podcast, Hi-Phi Nation. These episodes have all been about, and featured, activists. He is currently developing work on activism with David Killoren, with whom he co-produced one of these podcasts.

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Select publications

  • The Normative and the Evaluative: The Buck-Passing Account of Value. Oxford University Press 2019
  • ‘The Intelligibility of Moral Intransigence: A Dilemma for Cognitivism about Moral Judgment’ in Analysis 78, 2 (2018): 266-275.
  • Reasons or Fittingness First?’ in Ethics 128 (2017): 1, 212-229.
  • ‘The Significance of Significant Fundamental Moral Disagreement’ in Noûs 51 (2017):4, 802-831
  • ‘Our Intuitions about the Experience Machine’ in Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12 (2017): 1: 110-117
  • The Epistemology of Moral Disagreement’ in Philosophy Compass 12 (2017):2, 1-16
  • ‘In Defence of Good Simpliciter’ in Philosophical Studies 173 (2016):5, 1371-1391
  • Rescuing Companions in Guilt Arguments’ in Philosophical Quarterly 66 (2016):262, 161-171
  • Reasons as The Unity Among the Varieties of Goodness’ in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2016):2, 200–227
  • ‘Dissolving the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem’ in Philosophical Studies 172 (2015):6, 1455-1474
  • Wrong Kind of Reasons and Consequences’ in Utilitas 25 (2013):3, 405-416
  • Moral Error Theory and the Argument from Epistemic Reasons’ in Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (2013):1, 1-24

Public engagement

Editorial roles

  • Editor, Special Issue of Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2020

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